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Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd v.
Pacific Oilseeds, Inc.: An Unjustifiable
Expansion of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction in a Transnational Securities
Fraud Case
In transnational securities fraud cases heard by United States
courts, the principle commonly applied in determining whether subject
matter jurisdiction exists is that of territoriality.' The two variations of
the territorial principle are commonly known as the effects and conduct
tests.2 In general, the effects test grants jurisdiction over an act that
causes foreseeable and substantial consequences within the territorial
1 See Note, Extraterritorial-4pplication ofthe Federal Securities Code, I I VAND. J. TRANS. L.
711, 721 (1978). In the area of economic regulation there are three principles of jurisdiction in
international law: (1) nationality jurisdiction; (2) passive personality jurisdiction; and (3) territo-
rial jurisdiction. Id. at 720. The nationality principle allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over its
nationals wherever they may be. Id. Common law countries rarely use this principle as the sole
basis for exercising jurisdiction. Id. at 720, 721. The passive personality principle allows a state to
exercise jurisdiction in cases involving its own nationals as victims of the crime. Id. at 725. But
this principle is rarely used and is no longer recognized as a basis of jurisdiction. Id.
2 Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oil Seeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,416 (8th Cir.
1979).
No official body exists which promulgates rules governing the issue of subject matter jurisdic-
tion in an international setting. Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89
HARV. L. REv. 553, 554 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD Note]. The courts often refer to the
Restatement for guidance in deciding the jurisdictional issue. Id. The Restatement does not limit
congressional power, for Congress may extend jurisdiction beyond the Restatement's principles so
long as due process is not violated. Id. Nonetheless, the courts presume that Congress did not
intend to violate international law standards. Id. Thus, the Restatement principles are often used
to define the maximum scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id. at 555.
Also known as the "objective territorial principle," the effects test is set forth as follows, in
§ 18 of the Restatement:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that
occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a
crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule
applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foresee-
able result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the
principles of justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal sys-
tems.
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limits of the state, regardless of the situs of the act.3 The conduct test
grants jurisdiction when sufficient conduct occurs in the territory. In
Continental Grain (Australia) Py. Ltd v. Pacft Oilseeds, Inc.,5 the
Eighth Circuit held that subject matter jurisdiction existed under the
conduct test where the defendants' conduct in the United States fur-
thered a securities fraud scheme and where the conduct significantly
contributed to the perpetration of the fraud.6
This note will suggest that the holding in Continental Grain repre-
sents an unjustifiably expansive application of the conduct test. Recog-
nizing the Second Circuit's expertise in the securities law area, this note
will critically examine the case of that circuit, concluding that the Sec-
ond Circuit would not have found jurisdiction under the conduct test
on the facts of Continental Grain.' Next, SEC v. Kasser,8 a Third Cir-
cuit case relied upon by the court in Continental Grain, will be criticized
as an unwarranted expansion of the conduct test. Unwarranted or not,
Kasser also could have been distinguished on a number of grounds.9
Finally, a critical analysis will be made of the policies relied upon by
the court in Continental Grain."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
The conduct test is also known as the "subjective territorial principle" and is set forth, as
follows, in § 17 of the Restatement:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether or
not such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory.
Id. at § 17. The effects test was initially applied in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir.), rev'd inpart and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cer. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
The conduct test was initially applied in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,
468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
Not all the courts have applied the territorial principle in the same way. For example, some
courts have required that both the conduct and effects tests be satisfied before subject matter
jurisdiction would be found, while other courts have required that only one of the tests be satis-
fied. See Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
3 Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d at 416 (8th Cir.
1979).
4 Id.
5 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
6 Id. at 415, 421.
7 See text accompanying notes 20-51 infra.
8 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba), Ltd. v.
SEC, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
9 See text accompanying notes 52-79 infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 80-92 infra.
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THE FACTUAL SETTING OF CONTINENTAL GRAIN
Continental Grain, an Australian corporation wholly-owned by an
American corporation, purchased from American and foreign defend-
ants an Australian company, Pacific Seeds, the primary asset of which
was a supply of hybrid seedstock.11 Shortly after the purchase, Pacific
Seeds lost the lease to its supply of seedstock. 12 The American defend-
ants, owners of 49% of Pacific Seeds stock, never made direct contact
with Continental Grain but acted through their Australian agent, the
managing director of the corporation that owned the remaining 51% of
Pacific Seeds stock. Continental Grain then filed a securities fraud ac-
tion under Rule lOb-5 13 alleging that the defendants negotiated the
purchase without revealing that Pacific Seeds would shortly lose its pri-
mary asset. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 14
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Continental Grain contended that
subject matter jurisdiction should be granted under the effects or con-
duct test. The court granted jurisdiction under the conduct test, finding
that the defendants' conduct within the United States consisted pri-
marily of use of the mail and telephones. 5 The court reasoned that the
defendants' conduct was in furtherance of a securities fraud scheme
and significant with respect to its accomplishment. 6 In support of its
holding, the court referred to Second Circuit precedent,17 the Third
Circuit decision of SEC v. Kasser,'8 and various policy reasons.' 9
THE SECOND CIRCUIT: A LESS EXPANSIVE CONDUCT TEST
In securities cases many federal courts have recognized the exper-
tise and authority of the Second Circuit.20 Indeed, one Supreme Court
Justice has called the Second Circuit the "Mother Court" of securities
11 592 F.2d at 411.
12 Id.
13 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). Most transnational securities fraud cases are brought under
Rule lOb-5 and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
14 592 F.2d at 413.
15 Id. at 415.
16 Id. at 421.
17 See text accompanying notes 22-45 infra.
18 See text accompanying notes 52-53 infra.
19 See text accompanying notes 80-83 infra.
20 On the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in transnational securities fraud cases, Second
Circuit decisions have been cited as authority by other circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Cook,
573 F.2d 281,284 (5th Cir. 1978); Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1977);
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3rd Cir. 1976); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473
F.2d 515, 524 (8th Cir. 1973).
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law.2 It is no surprise, then, that the first case to apply the conduct test
in a transnational securities case, Leasco Data Processing Equ#pment
Corp. v. Maxwell,' arose there.
In Leasco, an American corporation claimed that the defendants
made fraudulent misrepresentations about the defendants' stock prices
causing the plaintiff to buy the defendants' stock at inflated prices in
violation of Rule lOb-5 and section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Act. 3
An agreement was signed in New York City for the sale of stock.
Before the agreement was closed, however, the plaintiff purchased the
stock on the London Stock Exchange.24 The court held that jurisdic-
tion existed largely because the defendants' conduct in the United
States, consisting mainly of meetings in New York, was an essential
link in the securities fraud, which induced the plaintiff to purchase the
stock.5
In dictum, the court disputed section 17 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,'26 which requires
extraterritorial conduct to be related to some interest within the terri-
tory in order for jurisdiction to vest.27 The court stated that significant
conduct alone would be sufficient to vest jurisdiction. 2' 8 Although this
language suggests that the court required only "significant conduct"
within the territory for jurisdiction to vest, the plaintiff was a resident
American corporation, unlike the nonresident corporate plaintiff in
Continental Grain. Hence, it remains a question how the Leasco court
would have decided the issue of jurisdiction had the plaintiff been a
non-resident foreign corporation.
The companion cases of lIT v. Vencap, Ltd 29 and Bersch v. Drexel
21 Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). There has been a notable lack of Supreme Court cases involving the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction in this area.
22 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
23 Id. at 1330.
24 Id. at 1332.
25 Id. at 1335. The court inferred from § 10(b) a congressional intent to protect against fraud
in the sale or purchase of securities whether or not traded in the United States. Id. at 1336. As
§ 10(b) was meant to apply to foreign as well as domestic markets, the court saw no reason why
§ 10(b) would not apply to foreign as well as domestic issuers of securities. Id.
26 RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 17.
27 468 F.2d at 1334. The court implies that jurisdiction would not vest where two foreigners
met in the United States for convenience and one of the foreigners fraudulently induced the other
to buy foreign stock on a foreign stock exchange. Id. at 1338. The court never defined "conven-
ience." But in view of the court's jurisdictional requirement that territorial conduct be essential to
the fraud, see text accompanying note 25 supra, it seems that conduct not essential to the fraud
would be insufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction.
28 468 F.2d at 1334.
29 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Firestone, Inc.3" refined the conduct test. In lIT, the plaintiffs
purchase of shares was fraudulently induced, and the plaintiff and de-
fendants were foreign entities.3 This opinion is often cited for the
proposition that, ceterisparibus, Congress favored jurisdiction in trans-
national securities cases as a means of preventing the United States
from being used "as a base for manufacturing fraudulent securities de-
vices for export ... 32 The court noted, however, that this interpreta-
tion of congressional intent went beyond that found in any prior case.33
Moreover, lIT limited extraterritorial jurisdiction by holding that ju-
risdiction would not extend to mere preparatory acts where the bulk of
the activity was performed in foreign countries.34
In Continental Grain, the fraudulent scheme was devised in the
United States.35 Nonetheless, to posit that the fraud was devised in the
United States does not automatically warrant a finding of jurisdiction
under the conduct test. The fraud was based on an omission of mate-
rial fact and, as the Eighth Circuit acknowledged, "the assignment of a
situs to an omission. . . is a very difficult task."36 Having difficulty
assigning a situs to the omission, the court focused on the defendants'
conduct in the United States in devising the fraud.37 It is noteworthy
that had the fraud been one of misrepresentation, rather than of omis-
sion, the situs of the fraud would have been assigned to Australia, since
all the direct negotiations between Continental Grain and the sellers of
Pacific Seeds occurred there.38 In such a case, the liT court probably
would have considered the defendants' conduct within the United
States as merely preparatory, with the bulk of the activity taking place
30 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub norm. Bersch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 423 U.S.
1018 (1975).
31 519 F.2d at 1004-05.
32 Id. at 1017.
33 Id. at 1018.
34 Id.
35 592 F.2d at 412.
36 Id. at 420 n.17. One commentator suggests that even where there is a United States situs, a
fraud action should be adjudicated abroad if the situs was merely fortuitously chosen or the de-
fendant induced the plaintiff into believing that United States law would govern. Note, The Ex-
traterritorial 4pplication ofthe 4ntifraud Provisions ofthe Securities Acts, 11 CORNELL INT'L LJ.
137, 152 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CORNELL Note].
37 592 F.2d at 420.
38 Id. at 411. Assigning the situs of the fraud to Australia may appear to be incorrect since the
fraud was devised in the United States. Yet, the Second Circuit implied that where the fraud is
devised is irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d at
987. What is important is where the fraudulent misrepresentations occurred. Id. See note 44 and
accompanying text infra. See also Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189, 1199-1200 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (conduct test not satisfied by foreign plaintiffs where misrepresentations were communicated
abroad).
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in Australia.39
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.40 is a transnational securities fraud
case that involved both foreign and American plaintiffs. Bersch's sig-
nificance lies in its treatment of the territorial principle of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction with respect to transnational securities cases. The court
integrated the effects and conduct tests by holding that the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in the
United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of material
importance occurred in this country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident abroad
if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance in
the United States have significantly contributed thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside
the United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the
United States directly caused such losses. 41
It is clear, then, that one must determine the type of plaintiff before
applying. the Bersch test. In Continental Grain the plaintiff was a for-
eign corporation, thus, according to Bersch, jurisdiction vests only if
the defendants' conduct within the United States directly caused the
plaintiff's securities losses.
Unlike Bersch, Continental Grain's treatment of the territorial prin-
ciple of jurisdiction did not distinguish among resident American
plaintiffs, non-resident American plaintiffs, or non-resident foreign
plaintiffs. Although Bersch involved more conduct within the United
States, the Second Circuit did not grant jurisdiction in the case of the
non-resident foreign plaintiff, even though, as was true in Continental
Grain, there was use of the mails and the facilities of interstate com-
merce.
42
Moreover, Continental Grain did not integrate the effects and con-
duct tests, holding instead that jurisdiction should be exercised where
39 The court in Continental Grain, itself, admitted that its facts presented a substantially for-
eign transaction. 592 F.2d at 421.
40 519 F.2d 974 (1975).
41 Id. at 993. Some commentators have noted that the three classifications of the Bersch hold-
ing raise constitutional problems. See CORNELL Note, supra note 36, at 146 n.67; HARVARD Note,
supra note 2, at 569; Comment, The TransnationalReach ofRule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1363,
1376-77 (1973) [hereinafter cited as PENN Note]. The distinction between Americans and foreign-
ers may violate the equal protection clause. See HARvARD Note, supra note 2, at 569. No case,
however, has to the author's knowledge faced the constitutional issue in this area. Application of
the Bersch rule to the facts of Continental Grain would appear to present less of a constitutional
problem than where the plaintiff was a foreign individual, because the plaintiff in Continental
Grain was a foreign corporation. See, eg., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S.
356 (1973).
42 592 F.2d at 420.
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either the effects or conduct tests were satisfied. 43 Finally, Continental
Grain construed the conduct test as requiring only "significant conduct
with respect to the fraud." 44 With respect to foreign plaintiffs, Conti-
nental Grain's threshhold of conduct is lower than Bersch's "direct cau-
sation" threshhold. Therefore, Continental Grain's application of the
conduct test will inevitably grant jurisdiction more frequently than the
Second Circuit in the case of the non-resident foreign plaintiff.45
The most recent Second Circuit application of the conduct test is
contained in Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale pour
L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull SA.46 The plaintiffs alleged that
the parent corporation of one of the defendants had a main office in the
United States that was aware of a cover-up of the securities fraud.47 In
dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the
court found the above allegation conclusory.48 The court went on to
state that even if the allegation were true, jurisdiction would not vest
because the cover-up phase of the fraud was insufficient conduct in
view of the predominantly foreign plaintiffs and transactions.49
Fidenas also reaffirmed the Bersch holding which limited extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction in cases involving non-resident foreign plaintiffs to
situations where the territorial conduct directly caused the fraud.
50
Despite Continental Grain and SEC v. Kasser, the Second Circuit is
continuing to apply the Bersch test51 and, in so doing, would likely
deny jurisdiction on facts resembling those in Continental Grain.
THE DECISION IN SEC v KISSER
Continental Grain's holding and analysis draw heavily from SEC v.
Kasser. Not only does Continental Grain cite Kasser as support for its
holding,52 but the former also engages in a lengthy analysis of Kasser
and an outright adoption of three policy grounds stated in Kasser in
43 Id. at 417.
44 519 F.2d at 985 n.24. Not only were there telephone calls and mailings from the United
States as in Continental Grain, but there was also the involvement of the SEC, a New York law
firm, and American accountants in the preparation of the allegedly misleading prospectuses. Id.
The Bersch court explained its holding by noting that none of the misrepresentations were com-
municated in the United States. Id. at 987.
45 See notes 80-92 and accompanying text infra.
46 606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979).
47 Id. at 8.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 9-10.
51 Id.
52 592 F.2d at 416.
270
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order to justify its expansive reading of the conduct test.5 3
In Kasser, the Securities and Exchange Commission sought an in-
junction against certain defendants who had allegedly committed se-
curities fraud. 4 The victim of the fraud was the Manitoba
Development Fund, a Canadian corporation owned by the Province of
Manitoba.55 The court found that jurisdiction existed based on various
conduct by the defendants in the United States including: (1) use of
instrumentalities of interstate commerce in furtherance of the fraud; (2)
various negotiations and the execution of one of the investment con-
tracts; (3) transmittal of the proceeds from the alleged fraudulent trans-
actions; and (4) incorporation or maintenance of offices by one of the
defendants in the United States.56 The court held that the conduct test
was satisfied "where at least some activity designed to further a fraudu-
lent scheme occurs within this country."57 As the court in Continental
Grain noted, Kasser's holding "extended the boundaries of the neces-
sary domestic conduct required to find subject matter jurisdiction as
defined in Bersch-IIT."58
In expanding the scope of jurisdiction under the conduct test,
Kasser appeared to rely blindly on an earlier Third Circuit decision,
Straub v. Vaisman & Co. 9 The court in Straub found jurisdiction
where an American defendant engaged in fraudulent sales of securities
to non-resident foreigners, the securities having been traded on an
American stock exchange.60 Citing Leasco, the Straub court stated that
"conduct within the United States is alone sufficient from a jurisdic-
tional standpoint to apply the federal securities statutes .... ,,6" This
citation, however, was taken out of its original context.62 The Leasco
court did not mean that any conduct within the United States was suffi-
cient from the standpoint of jurisdiction; rather the court found that, in
some cases, conduct alone may be sufficient to vest jurisdiction. If the
53 Id. at 418-22.
54 548 F.2d at 112.
55 Id. at I11.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 114.
58 592 F.2d at 418. The Bersch and lT holdings have generally been followed. See Com-
ment, Jurisdiction in Transnational Securities Fraud Cases-SEC Y. Kasser, 548 F2d 109 (3rd Cir.
1977), 7 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 279, 287 (1978) [hereinafter cited as DENVER Comment].
Kasser, however, liberalized the territorial conduct requirement for jurisdiction. Id. at 295-96.
Moreover, Kasser ignored the qualitative tests ofjurisdiction applied in Bersch and iT, applying
instead a quantitative test. Id. at 295.
59 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976). See CORNELL Note, supra note 36, at 149, n.77.
60 540 F.2d at 595.
61 Id.
62 See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
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Leasco court did mean that "any" conduct was sufficient, then it would
not have held that conduct essential to the fraud was necessary for ju-
risdiction to vest.63
In further support of its expansive holding, Kasser pointed to the
Second Circuit cases of IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.'4 and Bersch v. Drexel Fire-
stone, Inc.6" In what the Continental Grain court itself referred to as a
"cryptic" passage,66 Kasser stated that there was far more domestic
conduct in Kasser than in Bersch,67that the defendants' intranational
actions were substantial, 68that it is questionable whether the defend-
ants' acts did not directly cause any extraterritorial losses,69 and that
defendants' conduct within the United States was essential to the
fraud.7 ° In view of these considerations, the court concluded that there
was "little in Bersch which stands against jurisdiction in [Kasser]...
even in spite of the fact that the sole victim of the fraud was a Cana-
dian corporation. '71 Moreover, the court heavily weighed the IT dic-
tum that Congress did not intend the United States to be used as a
manufacturing base for the export of securities fraud.72
Kasser's reliance on those cases seems misplaced. Both cases re-
quired intranational or territorial conduct to be the direct cause of the
fraud where the plaintiff was a non-resident foreigner.73 Kasser, how-
ever, only required "some activity designed to further a fraudulent
scheme" for jurisdiction to vest.7 4 Thus, it is unlikely that the Second
Circuit would have granted jurisdiction on Kasser's facts.
In view of the tenuous ground upon which Kasser stands, Conti-
nental Grain is also weakened. In any event, Continental Grain could
have distinguished Kasser and thus not adopted such an expansive in-
terpretation of the conduct test. First, Kasser involved a plaintiff that
63 See text accompanying note 25 supra. See HARVARD Note, supra note 2, at 555.
64 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
65 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 423 U.S.
1018 (1975).
66 592 F.2d at 419.





72 Id. at 113-14.
73 519 F.2d at 993. Although HT does not explicitly adopt the Bersch test, it is reasonable to
assume this adoption because IT is Bersch's companion case.
74 548 F.2d at 114. Kasser may be interpreted to stand for a more stringent standard ofjuris-
diction than merely "some activity," for the court deemed the defendants' conduct substantial,
significant, and essential to the fraud. See DENVER Comment, supra note 58, at 297.
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was a subdivision of a foreign government.75 Since one of the policy
reasons for granting jurisdiction in Continental Grain was to preclude
reciprocal responses by foreign nations,76 Kasser provided a stronger
case for granting jurisdiction. Second, there was more conduct within
the United States in Kasser than in Continental Grain.77 Finally, Conti-
nental Grain involved a private cause of action, not an SEC injunc-
tion.78 The Supreme Court has limited private rights of action, but not
SEC injunction actions, under Rule lOb-5. 79 Therefore, one would ex-
pect a court to grant jurisdiction more readily in Kasser than in Conti-
nental Grain.
POLICY ARGUMENTS
Noting that the facts presented a substantially foreign transaction,
the court in Continental Grain admitted that its decision to exercise ju-
risdiction was largely based on policy grounds.8° Without any critical
discussion the court adopted three policy rationales in toto from
Kasser: (1) the deterrence of those who desire to defraud foreign buy-
ers or sellers of securities from using the United States as a base of
operations;8 (2) the encouragement of effective anti-fraud enforcement
internationally;82 and (3) the fulfillment of congressional intent, as re-
flected in the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, to
raise the standard of conduct in securities transactions.83
The first of the three policies appears to be no more than a restate-
ment of dictum in IIT, ie., Congress did not intend "to allow the
United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent securi-
ties devices for export."84 The IIT court, however, weakened the force
of this dictum by limiting jurisdiction under the conduct test to "the
perpetration of fraudulent acts. . . not. . to mere preparatory activi-
ties. . . where the bulk'of the activity was performed in foreign coun-
75 548 F.2d at 111.
76 592 F.2d at 421.
77 See text accompanying notes 13-14 and 56 supra.
78 592 F.2d at 413.
79 See Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977).
80 592 F.2d at 421.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. Even though its policy justifications may be overbroad, Kasser's result may have been
"correct" because of two considerations. See CORNELL Note, supra note 36, at 153. First, a sub-
stantial part of the fraud proceeds were transmitted to the United States; hence, swift action by the
SEC was necessary to prevent waste of the proceeds. Id. Second, a successful Canadian prosecu-
tion of the defendants was unlikely. Id. These two considerations also may be used to distinguish
Kasser from Continental Grain. See text accompanying notes 75-79 supra.
84 519 F.2d at 1017.
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tries."85
The second policy listed does not necessarily imply jurisdiction in
cases like Continental Grain. International anti-fraud enforcement in
the securities realm may be discouraged rather than encouraged by vig-
orous extraterritorial application of the anti-fraud laws.86 Observing a
vigorous enforcement effort by the United States, other nations may
ease their own enforcement efforts. Thus, international enforcement of
such laws may suffer a net decrease in effectiveness.
Continental Grain's acceptance of this third policy ground assumes
that Congress intended to elevate the standard of conduct in transna-
tional securities transactions via the passage of the anti-fraud provi-
sions of the securities laws. Yet, the court itself indicated that no
legislative history exists respecting the extraterritorial application of the
anti-fraud provisions.87 Thus, ascertaining congressional intent on this
point is a speculative venture at best.
Two countervailing policies that the court failed to consider are
the conservation of judicial resources and the minimization of vexa-
tious litigation. In Fidenas, the court stated that Congress would not
have "wished the previous resources of United States courts and law
enforcement agencies to be devoted to a case of this nature."8 This
policy of judicial economy applies with equal force to Continental
Grain, where the parties and the transaction were predominantly for-
eign and the territorial conduct sparse.8 9
The Supreme Court has stated that "litigation under Rule lOb-5
presents a degree of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from
that which accompanies litigation in general." 90 One factor aggravat-
ing this vexatiousness is that in Rule 1Ob-5 actions a complaint that
apparently has little chance of success at trial has a disproportionate
settlement value to the plaintiff so long as he prevents the suit from
being dismissed.9 In fact, the pendency of the suit may delay the de-
85 Id. at 1018.
86 See generaly Hacking, The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Laws: A Causefor
Concern Amongst Friends ofAmerica, I Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1 (1979).
87 592 F.2d at 416 (citing SEC v. IKasser, 548 F.2d at 114 n.24).
It has been noted that the main purpose of the federal securities laws is to protect American
investors or to insure the integrity of the American stock exchanges. PENN Note, supra note 41, at
1397. It is doubtful whether either purpose is served by the Continental Grain decision since
neither American investors nor an American stock exchange were involved.
88 606 F.2d at 10.
89 See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
90 Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975). See also Sante Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1979).
91 Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975).
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fendant's usual business operations which are totally unrelated to the
lawsuit. By expansively interpreting the conduct test, the court in Con-
tinental Grain has heightened the danger of vexatious litigation in Rule
lOb-5 actions brought by non-resident foreign plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
In holding that significant conduct in furtherance of the securities
fraud would be sufficient to vest jurisdiction in transnational securities
cases, Continental Grain expanded the jurisdictional boundaries of the
conduct test established by the Second Circuit. In Bersch, the Second
Circuit held that with respect to foreign non-resident plaintiffs there
must be direct causation between the fraud and the territorial conduct
in order for jurisdiction to vest. Continental Grain only required signifi-
cant conduct.
By drawing upon Kasser as support for its holding, the Continental
Grain court erred. First, Kasser's holding is an unwarranted expansion
of jurisdiction under the conduct test. Second, Continental Grain could
have distinguished Kasser and thus avoided extending an expansive
conduct test to the Eighth Circuit.
Finally, and most importantly, Continental Grain placed undue re-
liance on certain policy arguments. Besides its failure to evaluate these
policies critically, the court also failed to consider two significant coun-
tervailing policies. That is, by expansively interpreting the conduct
test, Continental Grain not only approved the use of precious judicial
resources in a predominantly foreign dispute, but it also opened the
door to more vexatious litigation in the area of transnational securities
fraud.
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